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are beneficial to the principal. Such a standard, although possibly having an unfortunate operation in some cases, is not only not unduly restrictive of war-time relations
but coincides with the policy of our war-time legislation, in which prevention of benefit
to the enemy, not the indiscriminate prevention of all intercourse, is the guiding objective. Tingley v. Muller, [1917] 2 Chanc. 144; Keppeirnan v. Keppelman, 89 N.J. Eq.
390, IO5 At. i4o (19r8), revd. on other grds., 91 N.J. Eq. 67, io8 Aft. 432 (1919); see
Tait v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 23 Fed. Cas. 62o, 624 (1873). There is no danger inherent in
intercourse. It is only when it prejudices the interests of the government that the
agency relation which induced it should be terminated. Cf. 31 Harv. L. Rev. 637
(1918). The unfairness of such termination by means of the orthodox approach is particularly evident in the principal case, where the defendant was not held bound to his
agency contract though he did not begin his work until 1919, when hostilities had
ceased.
Bankruptcy-Preferences-Date for Determining Preferential Character of Payment-[Massachusetts].-Action was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover
partial payments made by the bankrupt to the defendant creditor within four months
of filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The defendant maintained that no preference
was effected because, at the time of the payment, the debtor's assets were large enough
to have permitted similar payments to all creditors. Held, there was a preference, because the preferential character of a transfer is determined as of the time of the petition, not of the transfer. Brown v. Pahner Clay Products Co., 195 N.E. 122 (Mass.
1935).
Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act defines a preference as a transfer within four
months of the bankruptcy petition, by an insolvent debtor, when "the effect of the
transfer will be to enable any one of his creditors to obtain
enforcement of such ....
a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class."
36 Stat. 842 (igio), ii U.S.C.A. § 96(a) (1927). One construction of this section is
that it applies to transfers which enable one creditor to obtain a greater percentage at
the time of the transfer. Another view extends it to transfers which in the future will
effect such inequality. 4 Remington, Bankruptcy § 1813 (3d ed., 1923). Thus, a payment when the debtor's assets would permit like payments to all creditors is not preferential under the first construction (Peck & Co. v. Whitmer, 231 Fed. 893 (C.C.A. 8th
1916); Haas v. Sachs, 68 F. (2d) 623 (C.C.A. 8th 1933)), while it is preferential under
the second if the ultimate result of the transfer, in view of the failure to make equal
payments to all creditors, is that one creditor obtains a greater percentage of his debt
than do the others. Rubenstein v. LottoW, 220 Mass. i56, i1 N.E. 973 (1916); Commerce-Guardian Trust & Saving Bank v. Devlin, 6 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1925);
Eyges v. Boylston NationalBank, 294 Fed. 286 (D.C. Mass. 1923).
Under § 6ob, a voidable preference exists when an insolvent debtor makes a transfer
within the four month period, if the "transfer then operate as a preference, and the person receiving it .... shall then have reasonable cause to believe" that the transfer
would effect a preference. 36 Stat. 842 (igio), ii U.S.C.A. § 96(b) (1927). According
to one interpretation, based upon the use of the words "then operate" and "then have
reasonable cause to believe," the determination of the preferential character of a transfer must be made as of the time of the transfer because the word "then" is taken as
referring to a time specified: the time of the transfer. If at that time the creditor has
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not received a greater portion of his debt than other creditors could have received by
payments at the same time, it is not a voidable preference, regardless of the fact that
upon bankruptcy the creditor receives a greater percentage than others. So construed,
such partial payments as were made in the principal case have been held not voidable.
Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F. (2d) 614 (C.C.A. 8th 1930); Slayton v. Drown,
93 Vt. 290, 107 Ad. 307 (gig). The conflicting construction of the section is explained
by the fact that no technical definition is given the term "preference" in subsection
(b), and reliance must be placed upon the definition in (a). If (a) is read into (b), a
transfer can operate as a voidable preference if the final effect in the event of bankruptcy will be to enable one creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
that obtained by other creditors. And the word "then" may be treated as having been
inserted to preclude the possibility of avoiding a transfer which, at the time of its being
made, treated all creditors alike; as, for example, an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. The requirement that the creditor must "then have reasonable cause to
believe that a transfer would effect a preference" would be satisfied by proof that the
creditor knew of the debtor's insolvency and that like payments were not being made
to all creditors.
The National Bankruptcy Conference, recognizing the ambiguity of § 6o, has proposed a re-definition of a preference as a transfer by an insolvent debtor when such
transfer "is not made for the benefit in like proportion of all other creditors of the same
class, and is not accompanied by transfers giving all other creditors like benefits," and
seeks to make a preference voidable "if the creditor has, at the time when such transfer
is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent and that not all the
other creditors of the same class are then receiving like benefits." National Bankruptcy Conference, Proposed Amendments-Committee Print, May 15, 1935, at pp. 152,
'55. This re-definition seems desirable not only because it avoids a construction leading
to practical administrative difficulties in computing percentages and investigating the
bankrupt's balance sheet at the date of every transfer within the four-month period,
but also because it realizes one of the fundamental objectives of the Bankruptcy Actequality of treatment for creditors. 29 Yale L. J. 112 (i919); Bank v. Sherman, io
U.S. 406 (1879). A creditor could no longer receive ioo per cent as to the part paid
before bankruptcy, plus a pro rata share of the balance, or a total percentage greater
than that received by other creditors. Commerce-GuardianTrust and Savings Bank v.
Devlin, 6 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 6th 1925); Bronx Brass Foundry,Inc. v. Irving Trust Co.,
76 F. (2d) 935 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).

Banks-Constructive Trusts-Right of Trustee in Bankruptcy to Recover Funds
Placed in Non-designated Depository-[Federal].-A trustee in bankruptcy deposited
funds in a bank after being informed by the bank's vice-president that he presumed
the bank was an authorized depository for bankruptcy funds. The bank was not so
authorized and, upon its failure, the trustee sought a preference. Hdd, the trustee was
entitled to no preference, although some deposits were in cash and could be traced.
It re Bogena & Williams, 76 F. (2d) 950 (C.C.A. 7th 1935).
There is no dispute but that the ordinary general deposit of trust funds by a trustee
having power to make such a deposit results only in a debtor-creditor relation. In re
Bologh, 185 Fed. 825 (D.C. N.Y. i9u); i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees ioi (I935). A

